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Abstract 
For close to what seems a millennium, tax avoidance activities have plagued global 
tax jurisprudence especially in Nigeria where legislative and judicial solutions to it have 
remained illusory.  This paper represents an attempt to analyse issues and doubts that trail the 
application of anti-avoidance provisions in Nigeria. 
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1  Introduction 
It is fit and proper in the course of the millennium to take stock of an issue that has 
plagued tax jurisprudence since 1936 and Nigerian tax law since 1961 when the Income Tax 
Management Act was promulgated3. The purpose of this work therefore is to attempt a 
comparative analysis of anti-avoidance legislations and its application in the light of the 
present nature of tax law in Nigeria.4 
 
2 Anti-Avoidance Legislations 
Anti-avoidance legislations are statutory provisions which seek to prevent an escape 
from liability to tax payer using artificial or fictitious transactions to dodge tax. The escape of 
liability usually involves no criminality.5 
Anti-avoidance legislations are fairly common in most countries and the following are 
examples of countries where they are applicable.6 
 
                                                 
1  LL.B, PhD (ABU), LL.M (Lond.), B.L. FCII, FCIB. Professor of Revenue Law, Faculty of Law, 
Lagos State University, Lagos, Nigeria and can be reached by email @ mtabdulrazaq@gmail.com.  
2  LL.B (BUK), LL.M (OAU), Ph.D. (IIU, Malaysia), Senior Lecturer, Department of Business Law, 
University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria and can be reached by email @ adam_kayus2003@yahoo.com. 
3  See section 14 of the 1961 (ITMA) 
4  See generally Abdulrazaq M.T. (1991) Legislation Against Tax Avoidance: The Nigeria Experience Justice: 
Journal of Contemporary Legal Problems Vol.2 No.9 pp.33-46 (Federal Ministry of Justice). 
5    Abdulrazaq M.T. (1992) The Legal Nature of Tax Evasion and Avoidance, Nigerian Financial Review Vol.4. 
No.3 pp.65-74 (Infodata Publication). 
6  See Tax Law in the Melting Pot (1985) Appendix 1 (The law Society of England and Wales). 
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2.1 Australia 
(a) Fiscal Background 
Australia is a federation comprising six states and two federal territories, plus, external 
territories. Tax is imposed at both state and federal level. 
Domestic federal taxation is imposed on income; the government has introduced an indexed 
capital gains tax in respect of capital gains on assets acquired after 19 September 1985, at 
normal personal and corporate income tax rates (death will not constitute a deemed disposal); 
there is no wealth tax or tax on estates, inheritances or gifts. There is no stamp duty at the 
federal level on transfers of property; customs duty and sales tax are charged at federal level. 
 
(b) Anti-Avoidance Legislation 
A general anti-avoidance provision has been comprised in the income tax legislation 
since the last century. Its scope has largely been determined by judicial interpretation; and 
judicial attitudes, as exemplified by judicial interpretation have varied over the years. 
However, the existence of such a provision has meant that it has not been necessary for the 
judiciary to incorporate into Australian tax law without statutory justification the equivalent 
of a general, anti-avoidance provision, by the adoption of any general doctrine such as bona 
fide business purpose test, abuse of rights, substance versus form or similar. No such general 
concept has as such been imposed by the courts and the anti-avoidance provisions contained 
in statute are not drafted is such terms nor, until recently, have the tax authorities sought to 
have such a general concept imposed. In the last few authorities sought to have such a general 
concept imposed. In the last few years, however, inspired by Ramsay and other UK cases, the 
Commissioner has argued f\or similar principles to be applied in Australia, so far without 
success. Nevertheless the interpretation over the years of the general anti-avoidance 
provisions has resulted in an approach not dissimilar to a “Business purpose” test being 
hitherto adopted in many cases in determining whether such provisions were applicable. 
 
2.2 Canada 
(a) Fiscal Background 
Canada is a federation comprising provinces. Tax is imposed at both provincial and 
federal taxation level. The dominant tax in Canada is income tax. Capital gains tax (which is 
levied on emigration, gifts and death as well as on sales) is in effect levied as income tax by 
the inclusion of half the gain in the taxpayer’s income, other half being exempt. Corporations 
are taxed to income tax and not to a separate corporation tax. Tax levied on non-residents of 
Canada in respect of Canadian income is notionally a separate tax but it is based on income 
tax principles. There is no wealth tax, and the estate duty and gifts tax have been abolished. 
Other than Quebec, the provinces have legal systems largely based on that of the UK. Many 
of the concepts of UK law have been transposed into Canadian law. Quebec, with its French 
origins, has a civil law system including the concept of abuse of rights. Canadian revenue law 
has however been dominated by federal legislation and nothing has shown that the law of 
Quebec has been of any significant contribution to Canadian jurisprudence in strictly fiscal 
matters. 
(b) Anti-Avoidance Legislation 
Canadian law has a general provision nullifying artificial transactions, there being no 
statutory definition of “artificial”. Section 245 (1) of the Income Tax Act, set out below is 
however, by no means universally invoked by Revenue Canada: 
 
In computing income for the purpose of this Act, no deduction may be made 
in respect of a disbursement or expense made or incurred in respect of a 
transaction or operation that, if allowed, would unduly or artificially reduce 
the income. 
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2.3 New Zealand 
(a) Fiscal Background 
New Zealand is a non-federal country and therefore domestic taxation (properly so-
called) is imposed on a national basis only. Domestic taxation is imposed on income, but not 
on capital gains, although various provisions in the tax legislation effectively imposed income 
tax on what could be regarded as capital gains. There is no wealth tax, but there is a tax on 
estates, inheritances and gifts. There is also stamp duty calculated by references to the value 
of property transferred. 
 
(b) Anti-Avoidance Legislation 
There is a general anti-avoidance provision in the New Zealand Income Tax 
Legislation; currently section 99 Income Tax 1976. A similar provision dates back to the early 
part of the last century. In addition, there are what may be called specific anti-avoidance 
provisions in the legislations: For example, the provision permitting relief corresponding to 
UK group relief contain provisions intended to prevent tax avoidance schemes designed to 
enable that relief to be claimed. 
 
Section 99 Income Tax Act 1976 was first enacted in its present form in 1974, replacing the 
former section 108 of the Land & Income Tax Act 1954. It provides (section 99 (2)) that: 
Every arrangement made or entered into… shall be absolutely void as 
against the Commissioner for income tax purposes if and to the extent that, 
directly or indirectly: 
a. its purpose or effect is tax avoidance a defined term in section 99 (1); or 
 b.  where  it has two or more purposes or effects, one of its purposes (not   
being a merely incidental purpose or effect) is tax avoidance, whether or not 
any other or others of its purposes or effect relate to or are referable to 
ordinary business or family dealings… 
It also provides that the assessable income of any person affected by an arrangement avoided 
under Section 99(2) shall be adjusted “in such manner as the Commissioner considers 
appropriate so as to counteract any tax advantage obtained by that person from or under that 
arrangement…..” (Section 99 (3)). 
The replaced section 108 provided more simply that a contract, agreement or arrangement 
was void as against the commissioner “so far as, directly or indirectly, it has or purports to 
have the purpose or effect of in any way altering the incidence of income tax or relieving any 
person from his liability to pay income tax” 
 
2.4 United States 
(a) Fiscal Background 
The United States is a federation comprising fifty states and the federal District of 
Colombia plus external possessions. Tax is imposed at both state and federal level, and also 
by some municipalities. 
Domestic federal taxation is imposed on income and capital gains, on estates and generation 
skipping transfers, and no gifts. There is no wealth tax. There are federal excise taxes on sales 
of certain commodities. At federal level there are no stamp duties. 
(b) Anti-Avoidance Legislation 
There are numerous anti-avoidance provisions in the Tax Code. For example, the 
Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate may (i) under section 482 of the Code reallocate 
income and deductions among related parties in order to prevent evasion or clearly to reflect 
the income of the parties and (ii) under section 845 (b) may make proper adjustment”, in 
calculating the income of an insurance, company, for any reinsurance contract having “a 
significant tax avoidance effect”. Extensive regulations have been issued under section 482, 
which provide safe-harbours and other forms of protection against the exercise of unfettered 
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discretion. The Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation has described factors that should 
be taken into account in making the determination whether a significant tax avoidance effect 
exists, and those factors are incorporated regulations. 
 
3 Applying the Anti-Avoidance Legislation 
The traditional analysis of the legal function, and especially the judicial function, is in 
three parts –finding the facts, interpreting the law and applying the law as determined to the 
facts as discovered. In the Nigerian tax appeal system the first layer are the Appeal 
Commissioners, who do all three things , and the courts to which appeals lie, which can 
intervene only where threw is error of law and which therefore have no role in the 
determination of the facts. Of these three parts the third is perhaps the most interesting and 
certainly the least consciously analysed. What the courts are doing is determining the tax 
characterization of the facts with which they have been presented7.  
A major issue in the characterization of the facts is the extent to which the courts can take 
account of tax avoidance purposes. Related to this is the primary question of authority, that is 
the legal justification, for may particular anti-avoidance approach. Tax avoidance, which is 
lawful, must be distinguished from tax evasion, which is illegal. If a person marries in order to 
reduce his tax burden he is practicing tax avoidance; if he tells the tax authorities that he is 
married when he is not, he guilty of tax evasion, and may well be prosecuted. There is also an 
important distinction between a scheme under which no liability to tax arises – tax avoidance- 
and one under which a charge arises but the tax cannot be collected8.  
The distinction between avoidance and evasion in Nigerian was first raised in the case of 
Akinsete Syindicate v. Senior Inspector of Taxes.9 The case contains no analysis of the true tax 
effect of the transactions complained of: No evidence seems to have been put before the court 
as to this important distinction between avoidance and evasion or the doctrine of the sham 
transaction. Instead matters seem to have been dealt with on a very broad basis. This 
thoroughly unsatisfactory state of affairs is to be regretted. 10 
Tax avoidance has now been distinguished from tax mitigation but primarily for the purpose 
of interpreting a general anti-avoidance provision in New Zealand law,11 the distinction is that 
a tax avoidance plan does not affect the financial position of the taxpayer other than for the 
cost of the plan and the taxpayer is seeking to obtain a tax advantage without suffering the 
expense which Parliament intended should be suffered to quality for the advantage. Tax 
mitigation occurs when the expense is suffered. 
The Nigerian tax system has a general anti-avoidance provision.12 And the legal basis for the 
judges’ attitude towards avoidance schemes has to be found in interpreting the statutes and 
when applying the law to the facts. 
The present position is that it is the duty of the courts to apply the legislation to the facts as 
determined.13 The court has power to strike down a transaction because it is motivated by tax 
avoidance although the question is always what is the true effect in law of the real 
transaction?14 
                                                 
7  Tiley and Collision 1997-1998 U.K. Tay Guide (Butterworths). Pp. 13-31.  
8  See Roome v. Edwards [1979] BTC 546 at 661-565, [1979] BTR 261.1 Nigerian Tax Cases (NTC) 109 
9  See Variables, The Offshare Taxation Review 1997, p.1 
10  Per Lord Templeman in IRC, Challenge Corpn Ltd. [1986] STC 658 at 555. The New Zealand Provision was 
Income Tax Act 1976, 99 renders void for tax purposes arrangementsentered into for purpose of tax avoidance. 
11  See Section 21 GGTA; Section 18 CITA Section 17 PITD; Section 13 PPTA. 
12  The task is one statutory construction of more accurately, statutory application, e.g.Nourse IJ in Fitzwilliam 
v. IRC [1992] STC 185 at 198) CA 
13  E.g. Lord Templeman in Ensing Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v. Stokes (1992) STC at 229a, HI. 
14  Fitzwillam v. IRC [1993]STC 502, HL 
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In seeking the true legal effect the courts may treat a series of transactions as being one single 
transaction but only where it is possible realistically and intellectually to do so.15 The 
conditions for this power were laid down by Lord Oliver in the English case of Craven v. 
White:16 
 (1) that the series of transactions was, at the time when the intermediate 
transaction was entered into, preordained in order to produce a given result; 
(2) that transaction had no other purpose than tax mitigation; 
(3) that there was at that time no practical likelihood that the preplanned events 
would not take place in the order ordained, so that the intermediate 
transaction was not even contemplated practically as having an independent 
life; and  
(4) that the preordained events did in fact take place. In these circumstances the 
court can be justified in linking the beginning with the end so as to make a 
single composite whole to which the fiscal results of the single composite 
whole are to be applied. 
It could be said that the basic approach of the Nigerian tax system is still that laid down by 
Lord Tomlin in IRC v. Duke of Westminster17 that:  
Every man is entitled if he can to arrange his affairs so that the tax attaching 
under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds 
in ordering them so as to secure that result, then, however unappreciative 
the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his 
ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax. 
 
It followed that a transaction which on its true construction was of a kind that would escape 
tax was not taxable on the ground that the same result could have been brought about by a 
transaction in another form which would have attracted tax. 
 
3.1 The Duke of Westminster Case 
In IRC v. Westminster the Duke covenanted to pay an employee a sum of £ 1:90 per 
week; the covenant was to last seven years whether or not he remained in the Duke’s service. 
“The employee had a wage of £3 a week and he was told that while he would be legally 
entitled to the full £3 it was expected that in practice he would take only the balance of £1.10.  
The purpose of the scheme was to enable the Duke to deduct the payment in computing his 
total income for surtax.18 The scheme succeeded; the true construction of the document 
showed that these sums were income of the employee not under PAYE as an employee but as 
an annuitant, a charitable disposition. 
In reaching this conclusion the courts were entitled to look at all the circumstances of this 
case, including the fact that the taxpayer had received a letter containing the expectations of 
the Duke already referred to. However, the court was also entitled to look at the fact that the 
legal right to payment would continue even though the employment ceased. 
The majority of the court was not entitled to conclude that because this was a way in which 
money passed from employer to employee therefore it must be employment income if it was, 
in law, income under a charity. Lord Atkin, dissenting, thought this amounted to a contractual 
term and not just an expectation.19 
 
                                                 
15  [1988] STC 476 at 507. 
16  [1936] AC 1, 19 TC 490 
17  Sec payments are not now effective. 
18  Sec Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v. Stokes [1992] STC 226  at 235, HL 
19  LT (1996) STC 285 
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The doctrine emerging from the Westminster case is that taxpayers and the tax authorities are 
bound by the legal results, which the parties have achieved even though this may be 
inconvenient for the tax authorities. This doctrine is still the formal position of tax law; the 
real question is what those legal results are. The court cannot disregard those facts just 
because of the tax avoidance purpose, which may have led the parties to create those facts in 
the first place. Sometimes those legal facts may be decisive of the fiscal consequences, as in 
the cases on the boundary between the contract of service and contract for services. 
Sometimes, as in Westminster, these legal facts while not in them self conclusive may point 
decisively in the direction of one particular tax consequence or characterization. Hence in 
Westminster the fact that, if the gardener had been dismissed or had left the Duke’s 
employment he would still have been entitled to the sums under the covenant for the balance 
of the seven years period, swayed the majority to their conclusion. A more recent example is 
Reed v. Young20 in which the House Lords held that as the parties had created a limited 
partnership the courts were bound to give effect to a tax saving scheme based upon that legal 
structure. 
The Westminster doctrine was sometimes expressed in the form that the court must look to the 
form of the transaction and not its substance. This formulation is, however misleading in that 
it tends to suggest that the form of a transaction, a matter which may be within the control of 
the taxpayer, will be conclusive for tax purposes. Often, however, the legal form used by the 
parties is not conclusive and here it is accepted that the court must look at the substance of the 
matter in order to determine the true tax consequence of the transaction in the legal form 
adopted by the parties. 
Thus by looking at the substance it could conclude that this form attracted tax just as much as 
another. In these instances the court was not putting upon the transaction a legal character 
which it did not posses but was trying to discover the true character in tax law of the 
transaction entered into.21 
So the court might hold that a that trade is carried on by a partnership even though the only 
document states that there was none,22 that a trader is still trading even though he says he is 
not,23 or that the person claiming to trade is simply the means by which he trade is carried on 
by someone else.24 
In such contexts the documents cannot be used to deny proven facts. Where, however, both 
the facts and the legal arrangements point in the same direction, the court might not disregard 
them.25  
It follows that the name given to a transaction by the parties concerned did not necessarily 
decide the nature of the transaction.26 So a description of a series of payments as an annuity or 
a rent charge does not determine their character.27 
The Westminster doctrine was highly regarded by the United Kingdom Inland Revenue, not 
least because it was applied in their favour when the taxpayer has carried out a transaction in 
manner less than wholly tax-efficient.28 However, the doctrine was always subject to 
limitations. First the court might conclude that the transaction was a sham, that the acts done 
were intended to give the appearance of creating legal rights different from those which were 
actually created. Such schemes still fail for the simple reason that the tax falls to be levied on 
                                                 
20  Goerge MR in IRC v.  
21  Fenson v. Johnstone (1940) 23 TC 29 
22  I and R O’ Kane & Co. Ltd. v. IRC (1922) 12  TC 303 
23  Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Lewlin [1957] 1 AII ER 561, 37 TC 111 
24  Ransom v. Higgs (1974) 3 AII ER 949, 1197 STC 539, 
25  Secretary of State in Counsil of India v. Scoble (1903) AC 299, 4 TC 618. 
26  IRC v. Land Securities Investment Trust (1969) 2 AH ER 430, 45 TC 495. 
27  E.g. IRC v. Fleming & Co. (Machiners) Ltd (1951) 33 TC 57 at 62. 
28  (1984) STC 153, [1984] 1 AII ER 50 
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the basis of the actual legal rights created. This argument although frequently advanced by 
there venue did not meet with great success. 
However, the new approach based on the decision of the House of Lords in Furniss v. 
Dawson29encouraged the courts to give the Revenue occasional glimpses of success. So in 
Sherdley v. Sherdley,30 Sir John Donaldson MR thought that an order to pay school fees to a 
school on behalf of a child and made at the suit of the parent against whom the order would 
have been made would be a sham. 
This use of the sham argument is highly questionable and probably erroneous. The decision 
was later reversed by the House of Lords, but withour discussion of this point.31 Since then 
the orthodox narrow definition of a sham transaction has prevailed.32  
Second, Parliament has created exceptions; it has passed a number of measures enabling the 
Revenue to tax transactions, which are widely defined unless the taxpayer can show that there 
was no tax avoidance motive. 
Third it is probably right to distinguish the Westminster doctrine just outlined from a 
Westminster approach which tended to look not too unfavourably on attempts to avoid tax. 
This approach has wavered in recent years as the courts have been presented with highly 
artificial schemes such as that in Ramsay and only slightly less artificial ones such as Furniss 
v. Dawson. The courts have, however, been willing to uphold even highly artificial schemes 
as can be seen in Fitzwilliam v. IRC. 
Finally, although the courts have long recognized that tax avoidance is lawful, it is not yet a 
virtue and so in Re Weston’s Settlement 33  the English Court of Appeal declined to approve a 
variation of trust where the only advantages accruing to the beneficiaries on whose behalf 
they were being asked to approve the variation were financial, stemming almost exclusively 
from the saving of tax. Similarly in Sherdley v. Sherdley the Court of Appeal declined to 
make an order for financial provision of a child when the only reason for that order would 
have been the tax saving; this was reversed by the House of Lords but is an indication of a 
general attitude.34  
 
4 The Nigerian Position                                      
The basic approach of the Nigerian tax system which follows the principle laid down 
in the Duke of Westminster case was stated by Bairamian JSC in the case of Akinsete 
Syndicate v. Senior Inspector of Taxes35 that: 
It is trite that a person may use lawful means to avoid tax; what he may not 
do is to try to evade it. What he does should be genuine… not merely a 
verluo hide or dissemble the reality of things. 
In the case, an agreement was signed between one Chief G.M. Akinsete, the licensee of 
certain timber extraction rights and another company, Coast timber Company Limited, for the 
extraction, management and sale of the timber of the land over which the licensee had 
concession. The agreement permitted the sharing of profits between the two parties and it was 
signed in June, 1953. 
Another supplemental agreement was signed between the licensee (Chief Akinsete), the 
company and a joint licensee made up of four individuals in January, 1959. The supplemental 
agreement which created a partnership between the licensee and the joint licensee and merged 
the interest of the licensee and the joint licensee into one, provided that the interests and 
                                                 
29   (1986) STC 266 at 273. Balcombe, LJ disagreed (at 278) and Neill, LJ made no comment.  
30   (1987) STC 217. 
31   See e.g Lord Goff in Ensign Tankers (leasing) Ltd. V. Stokes (1992) STC 226 at 245h, HL.   
32   (1969) 1 Ch 223, (1968) 1 All ER 720. 
33   1987 STC 217. 
34   1 NTC 110.  
35  (1976) NTC 109. 
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benefit of the licensee under the first agreement “now belongs” to the joint licensee called 
“G.M. Akinsete Syndicate”. 
The respondent assessed Chief Akinsete to tax for the income accruing to him out of the 
timber business for the accounts of the year ended 1958. The appellant contended that because 
of the words “now belongs” in the second agreement, the income and other benefits accruing 
to Chief Akinsete had reverted to the joint partnership since the date of the first agreement in 
1953 and that for that reason Chief Akinsete could not be taxed on the income of the timber 
business accruing in 1958. 
It was also argued by the appellant that the partnership had existed as a matter of fact since 
the signing of the first agreement although the partnership agreement itself was signed only in 
1959. The respondent contended that there was no partnership in fact and in law by the year 
1958, on which the assessment was based, and that if there was any, the transaction was 
artificial and fictitious and should be disregarded in accordance with section 15 of the Income 
Tax Law of Western Nigeria, 1959. 
It was found on evidence that the share of profits of the partnership was paid into the account 
of Chief Akinsete who withdrew as he pleased and handed out money as he pleased. It was 
held that: 
1. The existence of the syndicate before 1959 was not proved. The 
supplemental agreement of 1959 only created the partnership on that date. 
2. The taxpayer was rightly assessed as the bona fide owner of the income 
accruing to him from the venture in 1958. 
3. Appeal dismissed. 
 
4.1 Anti-Avoidance Legislation in Nigeria                              
The status of the Akinsete principle was thrown into some doubt by a series of anti-
avoidance legislations beginning with the now repealed section 14 Income Tax Management 
Act (ITMA) 1961 which provides that: 
Where a tax authority is of the opinion that any disposition is not in fact 
given effect to or that, any transaction which reduces or would reduce the 
amount of any tax payable is artificial or fictitious, the tax authority may 
disregard the disposition or direct that such adjustments shall be made as 
respects the income of an individual, an executor or a trustee, as the tax 
authority considers appropriate so as to counteract the reduction of liability 
to tax effected, or reduction which would otherwise be effected by the 
transaction. 
and reaching its high water mark in the provisions of Section 22 of Company Income Tax Act 
2004,36 Section 20 Capital Gains Tax Act 200437 and section 17 of Personal Income Tax Act 
200438 which simply restated and re-enacted the repealed section variously. The Supreme 
Court of Nigeria has so far refused to give a judicial interpretation to the meaning of 
“artificial or fictitious transaction”, first, the case of Federal Board of Inland Revenue v. 
Nasr39 the Supreme Court stated that: 
At one stage in the High Court, the Board wished to submit that the 
transaction should be disregarded as an artificial one within the Income Tax 
Management Act but as this point has not been raised before the 
commissioners, the High Court refused to allow it to be raised on the further 
                                                 
36   See Cap C. 21, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 
37   See Cap C. 1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 
38   See Cap P. 8, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 
39   1 NTC 115, 116. 
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appeal and no evidence was called which could have justified such a 
finding. 
Secondly, in the case of Aboud v. Regional Tax Board,40the appellant brought an action in the 
High Court of Western Nigeria, asking for a declaration (i) that he was not liable to pay tax 
for the year of assessment 1962/1963 on property at No. 61A Lebanon Street, Ibadan on the 
ground that the property was not his property from which he derived an income and (ii) that 
the assessment notice served on him was null and void. 
His statement of claim made it clear that what he was objecting to was the decision of the 
Board to treat his action in conveying the property concerned to his wife as an artificial or 
fictitious transaction or disposition in accordance with Section 15 of the Income Tax Law 
(cap. 48), and the pleading concluded by saying that this decision was wrong in law and 
therefore null and void. 
The Supreme Court was urged that it was desirable to have an authoritative interpretation of 
Section 15 of the Income Tax Law (cap.48), the court stated that the appeals provided for by 
the law itself afford the means of securing such an interpretation and there is no reason for 
departing from the ordinary practice of the courts as regards declaratory judgments. The 
Supreme Court further held that, as regards the first part of the declaration sought in this case, 
if the court were to hold that the Board had been right it would add nothing to an assessment 
which has already become final and conclusive; if the court were to declare that the Board had 
been wrong it would take nothing from the assessment and would merely lead to confusion. 
On the pleadings, the court held that the second part of the declaration sought is consequential 
on the first and if the court declines to consider one it cannot consider the other. 
However, while emphasizing the significance of the anti-avoidance legislation it must be 
carefully stressed that the Akinsete principle was still law and had not been over-ruled. It may 
be distinguished like the Duke of Westminster’s case on the grounds that it: 
was about a simple transaction entered into between real persons, each with 
a mind of his own…. The kinds of tax avoidance schemes that have 
occupied the attention of the courts in recent years, however, involve inter-
connected transactions between artificial persons, limited companies 
without minds of their own but directed by a single master mind.41 
The importance of this approach is, first, that it enables one to explain the existence of 
commercial reality and secondly that it is much wider and more flexible than the simple-
almost mechanistic- excision approach of the anti-avoidance provisions.42 
 
4.2 Judicial Reluctance in Interpreting the Anti-Avoidance Legislations 
It is important for three reasons. First, it establishes that there is no mechanistic time 
period after which transactions cannot be linked. 
The second is that the cases underline the point that while the effect of the legislation being 
applied is to make the whole matter one transaction for tax purposes, that does not mean that 
the tax authorities can defeat it; the court still has to see whether the government position is 
realistically and intellectually defensible. The third reason is that it shows some signs of going 
back to the enduring effect argument used in the Duke of Westminster’s case and stated in 
Akinsete case that the courts will not disregard the enduring effects of what the parties have 
done when applying the anti-avoidance legislation. 
 
                                                 
40   1 NTC 125. 
41  Ramsay v. IRC [1982] STC 30 at 32. Sec  Gammic, Strategic Tax Planning, Part D, p.17.s 
42  For a general account of US doctrine see Bittker Federal Taxation of Income Estates and Gifts, 
especially Chapter 4. For example of skepticism see Rice, 51 Mich I.R at p. 1021; see also Tiley [1987] 
BTR 180 and 220, [1988] BTR and 108. For examinations of the UK cases from a US perspective see 
Popkin [1991] BTR and Kolb Hastings International and Comparative Law, Review Vol. 15, p. 159. 
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These cases show an ebb and flow of judicial opinion in determining the fiscal consequences 
of the facts which the parties have created – the problems of characterization – and underline 
how difficult that task can be especially when the courts are presented with highly artificial 
schemes. Faced with such problems the courts frequently like to emphasise the need to have 
regard to the reality of the situation or, less frequently, its substance. 
An example of this is the decision of the English House of Lords in Ensign Tankers (Leasing) 
Ltd. v. Stokes, which embodies a matter of approach rather than a rule. This approach allows 
(and probably requires) the courts to examine the reality of the situation reaching the correct 
tax characterisation of the facts. This may mark the reconciliation, at least at the formal level, 
of the New Approach with the Westminster doctrine since, of course, under that doctrine the 
labels given by parties did not matter and the court have long been required to determine the 
true legal character of the transactions. What may matter just as much is the emphasis given 
by Lord Templeman to the obligation of the courts to ensure that the taxpayer does not pay 
too much tax, not just too little.43 Neither the taxpayer nor the state should be deprived of the 
fiscal consequences of the taxpayers’ activities properly analysed. 
In the Ensign case the question was whether the taxpayer was entitled to capital allowances 
for expenditure incurred on the introduction of a film. The taxpayer company, E, which as 
may be surmised from its full name had little to do with world of films, formed a limited 
partnership, V, with some other companies to provide finance for a film to be directed by 
John Huston and starring Michael Caine. The film was also to feature such soccer legends as 
Bobby Moore and Pele and was called “Escape to Victory”.  V put up 25 percent of the 
estimated cost of the film ($3.2m out of $13m) the balance being provided by a non-recourse 
loan made to the general partner by the film company, L, a part of the Lorimar group with 
whom the partnership had no other connection. The partners, including E, had no personal 
liability. The film company was also to be responsible (on similar terms) for any cost overrun. 
The receipts from the film would be divided 25 percent to the limited partnership and 75 
percent to the film company until the loan was paid off and then to paying off the loan to 
cover the cost of the overrun of costs ($1m) and any interest on such loans. 
What V, and therefore E, hoped to achieve was that in return for putting up less than44 25 
percent of the cost, they would be able to receive capital allowances on the total cost of 
production since at that time the rate of corporation tax was 50 percent and the rate of the 
relevant allowances was 100 percent of the expenditure. The Crown attack was not less 
extreme: this was not a trading transaction and therefore was not entitled to any allowance at 
all, not even the expenditure of $3.25m which had been incurred. 
The commissioners held that this was not trading transaction since V’s paramount object of 
the transaction was to obtain a fiscal advantage. This was reversed by Millett J who held inter 
alia that the taxpayer was trading and that the correct test was an objective one; the full 
allowance was therefore due.45 The Court of Appeal reversed Millet J.46 
The House of Lords, reversing the Court of Appeal, produced a new solution. This was a 
trading transaction. V and therefore E were entitled to capital allowance on the expenditure 
actually incurred. However, the expenditure which had been incurred was $3.2m not $14m. 
This conclusion involved a close analysis of the fact to determine their true legal effect. The 
scheme would not be allowed to have the apparently magical effect of creating expenditure 
for tax purpose of $ 14m while incurring real expenditure of only $3.25m. The expenditure of 
the remaining $10.75m was really incurring by L. The House of Lords proceeded to penalize 
                                                 
43  [1992] STC 226 at 236 
44  After taking account of the overrun which was also financed by non-recourse loan. 
45  [1989] STC 705 
46  [1991] STC 136 
M.T. Abdulrazaq    K.I. Adam 
11 
the taxpayers for attempting a scheme which brought no credit on their advisers47 by making 
them pay all the costs of the appeal.48 
The importance of this case lies in its return to the true legal nature of the transaction and the 
emphasis on ensuring that the taxpayer did not end up paying too much tax: The presence of a 
tax avoidance purpose does not means that a scheme can simply be disregarded. One must, as 
Young v. Phillips 49  shows, find the real transaction. 
Before turning to some of the detailed issue emerging from these cases it is time to face the 
problem of authority- what is the basis for what the courts have been doing? If the matter is 
one of statutory interpretation in cases involving tax avoidance schemes then the courts have 
to explain where the authority for such a rule comes from. If, on the other hand, it is simply 
one of determining the correct tax characterization of the facts with which the courts have to 
deal then the problem of authority is solved but at the cost of opening up a very different form 
of rule. In the new form the rule is not one concerned exclusively with tax avoidance. In the 
Furniss v. Dawson 50  and Craven v. White51 cases the issue is not one of countering 
avoidance schemes but one of defining the circumstances under which a transfer from A to B 
followed by one from B to C could be treated as a single transfer from A to C or as an 
artificial transaction.  
At one time it appeared that the nature of the quest might be resolved by new litigation. In 
Whittles v. Uniholdings Ltd.52 The taxpayers had taken out a dollar bank loan to finance a 
sterling acquisition. In order to reduce their exposure to currency exchange risks the taxpayer 
also took out a forward contract with the same bank to buy the same number of dollars at the 
end of the period of the loan at a fixed sterling price. The issue was whether this will be 
treated as one single transaction or as two; in the latter some absurd but well known fiscal 
consequence accrue. The Revenue argued that the transactions should be taxed separately; the 
taxpayer that they constituted a single composite agreement between it and the bank under 
which it could not deal with forward contract without the consent of the bank. 
Sir John Vinelott held that there was a single composite transaction because that was the true 
contractual effect of the arrangement. In the court of appeal the Crown argued that there were 
two transactions whether or not there was a contractual nexus. Aldous LJ would have 
dismissed the appeal but was outvoted by Nourse LJ and Sir John Balcombe. 
For Nourse LJ what mattered was that but for the Ramsay case which he persisted in calling 
“the fiscal nullity doctrine”, he would have attached great weight to the House of Lords 
decision in Aberdeen Construction Group Ltd. V. IRC.53 He then said: 
If that would have been the position in the present case before the 
emergence of the Ramsay principle, has it now changed in any way? 
Clearly, it has not. At this point it is necessary to assure that there was no 
contractual link between the loan and forward contracts, that being the only 
footing on which the principle would have a part to play. Decision 
subsequent to Ramsay, itself, especially Craven v. White (1988) STC 476, 
(1986) AC 398, have shown that the principle is still in a process of 
development. Differences of opinion amongst their Lordship in Countess 
Fitzwilliam v. IRC (1993) STC 502, (1993) I WLR 1189 have shown that it 
is still uncertain where it has got to and to where it may go next. One thing 
                                                 
47  [1992] STC 266 at 234 
48  [1992] STC 266 at 244 
49  [1984] STC 520 
50  [1984] LAII ER 530 
51  [1989] A.C. 398 
52  [1993] STC 671, 767 
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may, however, be asserted without fear of contradiction. While… the 
principle, … one of statutory construction, is capable of being invoked by a 
taxpayer in certain circumstances, it is clear that if it had never before been 
thought of, it would not have been invented to enable the company to 
succeed in this case. More decisively still, it could not attributed to two 
transactions with no contractual link between them fiscal consequences 
different from those resulting from two transactions between which there 
was such a link 
Almost every sentence of this paragraph is worthy of close study. The oddity is that the 
English Court of Appeal then refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords. If ever a case 
demanded that their lordships resolve the problems they have created, it is this one. With a 
major unresolved issue as indicated by Nourse LJ and the lower judges split 2-2, the present 
impasses is unfortunate54. 
 
5 Issues and Doubts – Elements of the Anti- Avoidance Legislation  
A number of questions arise: 
1. Will the Nigerian course accept that the presence of any commercial motive, however 
slight, will exclude the application of the legislation? An affirmative answer is suggested by 
lord Brightman’s formulation and Nigeria case law does not yet suggest that the legislation 
will be excluded only if the commercial motive is the main one. This issue was raised in 
Craven v. White 55 where it was held that where there was two courses of action genuinely 
open to the taxpayer and actively being considered by him, one of which would have entitled 
him to use the deferral under what is now TCGA 1992, s136 despite Furniss v. Dawson,56  
and the other of which would not, the revenue could not use Furniss v Dawson to deprive him 
of the deferral as there was a sufficient commercial motive at the time of the disposal: this 
aspect of the case was not developed in the House of Lord.57 However in the speeches there 
are many references to transactions which have no commercial purpose other than the 
avoidance of tax. 
In Ensign Tanker (Leasing) Ltd. vs. Stokes in the Chancery Division millet J held that the 
court could not disregard the existence of a limited partnership where it was commercially 
essential to have some structure to regulate the relationship of the parties.58   
2. What is meant by a commercial motive? Is “commercial” simply a synonym for “non-
tax” so that, for example, a wish to protect the family wealth by the creation of a protective 
trust will be effective even though some tax sheltering will result? Likewise, is a wish to use a 
tax shelter company so as to be subject to external company law, which permits loans to 
directors, a sufficient “commercial” purpose?   
 There may be major difficulties about a case  which two partners go in for the same 
transaction where one is motivated purely by the thought of saving tax but the other has no 
raise money to pay maintenance to an ex- spouse or is motivated by some wish to preserve the 
business. In Shephered v. Lyntress Ltd. a need to avoid a pre–emption agreement over shares 
was held to be a sufficient commercial justification.59 
                                                 
54 .Whittles v. Uniholdings Ltd (No.3) (1996) STC 614, CA, reversing (1995) STC 185. 
   (1985) STC 531 followed in Baylis v. Gregory (1986) STC 22, (1986) 1 All ER 289, and IRC v. Bowater 
property development ltd. (1985) STC 783.      
56  (1984) 1 All ER 530, (1984) STC 153. 
57  However Lord Oliver said that was a bona fide commercial; purpose (1988) STC at 510). (1989) STC 705 at 
770; he also said that it was logically impossible to conclude that the partnership was trading and that 
the transaction entered into had no commercial purpose (at 771) however Lord Brightman’s text talks of 
no commercial effect, not no commercial purpose the revenue did not a appeal against this part of the 
judgment; (1991) STC 136 at 149.     
58  [1992] STC 226. 
59  [1989] STC 617 at 650 
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3. What taxes are affected by this legislation? So far the Nigerian cases have involved 
income tax or their corporate equivalent. It could be argued that stamp duties are not affected 
since those are taxes on instruments not transactions; however it can be countered that the 
legislation is ideally designed to counter avoidance schemes because it requires a broad view 
of the transaction which is being carried out by the instrument60  if the doctrine is simply one 
of characterisation of the facts all taxes are open to its applications. 
4. What is the role of the anti-avoidance legislation? Following precedents in other 
countries which have had to wrestle with general anti-avoidance provision it can be argued 
that the courts should not allow the use of the legislation if the taxpayer has simply carried out 
a straightforward transaction, falling exactly within the purpose and ambit of a provision of 
the tax legislation.61  
 Cases such as this may fall to be dealt with as having a sufficient commercial motive 
or as single step transactions. However, in relation to transactions within a group of 
companies, it has been held that the purpose of the express provision is to allow assets to be 
moved within the ring fence without any fiscal consequence and that this purpose should not 
be defeated.62  
More difficulty will be met where the taxpayer can bring himself within an express statutory 
defence. Will this exclude the legislation? It is though that it should.63  
5. Who can invoke the anti-avoidance legislation? This problem is now the fundamental 
one awaiting solution. Can the courts use it to undo statutory absurdities?64 There is a 
suggestion in Pattison v. Marine Midlord Ltd. that the courts can invoke it to counter an 
attempt by the Government to “invent an artificial accounting scheme which serves no 
purpose and is designed solely to create a liability to tax.65  
If, as in the current democracy, the matter is simply one of statutory application, there seems 
to be no logical reason why the Nigerian Courts should not be able to invoke the anti-
avoidance legislation suo motu 
6. Can the anti-avoidance legislation be invoked to change the timing or the location of a 
transaction?66 Thus suppose that I am about to emigrate (1st January) and wish to postpone a 
CGT disposal until after I have ceased to be resident in the Nigeria – so avoiding CGT- and 
yet require the certainty of the sale. I therefore agree that my purchaser shall have an option to 
buy on any day in January and I have the right to insist on a sale during February. This 
agreement is made in November but CGT timing rule will make the date of the disposal that 
where the contract become unconditional. 
 One may also note the view of one judge that when a disposal by A  to B is followed 
by one from B to C and this disposal is one preordained transaction that transaction should be 
treated as taking place at the time of the first step.67  
7. How do you identify an artificial or fictitious transaction? English Cases have 
reiterated the strict test laid down.68 In Hatton v. IRC69  Chadwick J said that a preordained 
series of transactions meant nothing more than a series transactions which had been pre-
planned to take place in a specific order in circumstances in which there was, at time the first 
                                                 
60  See Simon’s Weekly Tax Intelligence 1997, p. 1057. The principle that liability to stamp duty follows the 
true legal effect of the document is not contradicted. 
61  As was stated by Walton J in Reed v. Nova Securities Ltd. At first instances [1962] STC 724. 
62  Vinclott J in News International Plc v. Shepherd [1982] STC 724. 
63  [1985] STC 584 at 647. 
64  [1980] STC 341, 53 TC 304, Ang v. Parrish. 
65  [1983] STC 269 at 276, CA See also vinclott J in Bird v. IRC [1985] STC 584 at 647 
66  See the discussion by Gammie in Strategic Tax Planning Part D, p. D35 
67  See Vinclott J in Shephered v. Lyntress (1989) STC 617 at 650 
68  E.g Fitzwillam v. IRC [1993] STC 502, HL and Hatton v. IRC [1992] 64. STC 140 ,both dealing with IHT 
and shephered v. Lyntress [1989] STC 617. 
69  [1992] STC 140 
ANTI-AVOIDANCE LEGISLATIONS: ISSUES & DOUBTS IN THE APPLICATION 
OF TAX RULES IN NIGERIA 
14 
transaction was entered into, no practical likelihood that the remaining transactions would not 
take place in that order. There was, he said, no requirement of control over the decision to 
take the subsequent steps. Similarly in Fitzwilliam v. IRC there was a preordained scheme 
despite the fact that the clients were kept in dark as to totality of the scheme and that one of 
them was separately advised after step 3.70 Is a conclusion by the tax authorities that a series 
of transactions constitutes an artificial or fictitious transaction a question of fact or of law?  
In such cases…. the Commissioners should find the facts and then decide as a matter 
(reviewable) of law whether what is in issue is a composite transaction, or a number 
of independent transactions….71  
“ … the correct approach in this type of case, where inferences have to be drawn, is 
for the commissioners to determine (infer) from their findings of primary fact, the 
further fact whether there was a single composite transaction in the sense in which I 
have used that expression, and whether that transaction contains steps which were 
inserted without any commercial or business purpose apart from a tax advantage; 
and for the appellate court to interfere with that inference of fact only in a case 
where it is insupportable on the basis of the primary facts so found72  
In effect the question is essentially one of law.73 
6 Conclusion                                                          
Conclusions may now be firmer as a result of the Akinsete principle and the guidance of the 
English Courts. For the moment we have a test based on “no practical certainty” or “no real 
likelihood” that the second step will not follow the first.74 It is, moreover, consistent with the 
Nigerian notions of the interpretations, and application of tax statutes. 
Second, anti-avoidance legislation is not to allow the tax authorities to under, transactions 
simply because they have a tax avoidance motive. The courts are overtly fearful of creating a 
situation which would allow the tax authorities to strike down any transaction entered into for 
the avoidance of tax.75 
Third, it is hard to resist the conclusion perhaps a little cynically, that the tax authorities 
cannot tolerate judicial interference in this matter and may feel the need for more legislation, 
as has occurred most recently in Canada or, alternatively, retaliate with even more and more 
detailed legislation and regulations replete with anti-avoidance clause. Hopefully, a clearer 
picture on this should emerge before the year 3000. 
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